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Review
A Formal Valuation Framework for Emotions
and Their Control
Quentin J.M. Huys and Daniel Renz
ABSTRACT
Computational psychiatry aims to apply mathematical and computational techniques to help improve psychiatric
care. To achieve this, the phenomena under scrutiny should be within the scope of formal methods. As emotions play
an important role across many psychiatric disorders, such computational methods must encompass emotions. Here,
we consider formal valuation accounts of emotions. We focus on the fact that the ﬂexibility of emotional responses
and the nature of appraisals suggest the need for a model-based valuation framework for emotions. However,
resource limitations make plain model-based valuation impossible and require metareasoning strategies to apportion
cognitive resources adaptively. We argue that emotions may implement such metareasoning approximations by
restricting the range of behaviors and states considered. We consider the processes that guide the deployment of the
approximations, discerning between innate, model-free, heuristic, and model-based controllers. A formal valuation
and metareasoning framework may thus provide a principled approach to examining emotions.
Keywords: Computational psychiatry, Decision making, Emotion regulation, Emotions, Model based, Reinforcement
learning
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Computational psychiatry is a young ﬁeld hoping to leverage
advances in computational techniques to understand and
improve mental health (1–5). It is motivated on the one hand by
the necessity to bring novel statistical and machine-learning
techniques to bear on the rapidly expanding complexity of
novel datasets relevant to mental health, and on the other hand
by the complexity of the problem itself as mental health relates
to the most difﬁcult tasks performed by the most complex of
organs.
Emotions are central to mental health, and emotional
disorders contribute substantially to the burden of mental
illnesses (6). The traditional dichotomization of emotion and
reason might question the feasibility of applying computational
techniques to the core issues of emotion. It is therefore
imperative for computational psychiatry that we consider the
ability of a computational and mathematical framework to
address core emotional phenomena. Here, we argue that
approaching emotion computationally requires the introduc-
tion of model-based valuation and metareasoning. Meta-
reasoning considers optimal valuation in the face of resource
constraints (7–9). The proposal is that human emotions involve
strategies to deal with the complexity of model-based or goal-
directed decision making by focusing on particular aspects of
the problem at hand.
Research on human emotions is complicated as questions
about their nature continue to divide the scientiﬁc community
(10,11). Nevertheless, there is consensus on a number of key
components that characterize emotions, and this review
attempts to view them in a computational light. We ﬁrst provide
a description of important features of emotions, then introduce
valuation and the metareasoning problem, then relate
approximate metareasoning strategies to features of emotions,
and ﬁnally describe the control of approximate metareasoning
strategies.
INGREDIENTS OF A COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH
TO EMOTIONS
Key features of human emotions that require accounting for and
that are emphasized to various degrees in different conceptu-
alizations are 1) correlated physiological, psychological and
behavioral processes shaped by evolutionarily predeﬁned neu-
ral circuitry; 2) interpretations or appraisals; and 3) conscious
verbal self-report about emotions. Key problems in contempo-
rary research on human emotions include to what extent the
three feature domains are related (e.g., how conscious emotions
in humans relate to evolutionarily predeﬁned circuitry) and to
what extent emotions are discrete entities.
Basic emotion theories suggest that there are a limited, rela-
tively ﬁxed, number of universal, evolutionarily shaped, culture-
independent, and neurobiologically hard-coded emotional
categories including happiness, surprise, sadness, disgust,
anger, and fear (11–13). For the present purpose, what is
important is that these represent a set of innately interlinked
physiological, behavioral, and psychological processes that are
triggered in an inﬂexible manner by species-speciﬁc salient
stimuli, akin to unconditioned responses. Animal research, in
which speciﬁc responses to species-relevant stimuli are
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observable and readily quantiﬁable, has contributed to this view.
However, behavioral responses in animals cannot be directly
translated to emotional experiences in humans. Amygdalar and
hippocampal damage, for instance, abolish physiological and
autobiographical signatures of aversive conditioning, respec-
tively, while leaving the other intact (14). Furthermore, aversive
conditioning can be performed subliminally and can evoke
amygdala activity and physiological response, but can fail to
result in any emotion of fear (15,16), while amygdalar lesions can
leave human fear unaffected (17,18).
Human emotional responses to stimuli are characterized by
substantial within- and between-subject variability. Appraisal
theory locates one explanation for this variability in the inter-
pretation (be it conscious or unconscious) of a particular sit-
uation or stimulus as being relevant to the individual’s goals
(19). This interpretation depends on the goal and the in-
dividual’s beliefs in addition to the stimulus. A stimulus or
situation being interpreted as increasing the changes of
reaching one’s goals would, for instance, result in the emotion
of joy or happiness (20–22). However, just like basic emotion
theories, appraisal theories often view the expressed emotion
itself as a “deﬁnable pattern of outputs that preexist within the
individual” (10). For instance, Scherer (23) deﬁned them as
“episode[s] of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states
of all or most [.] organismic subsystems in response to the
evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant
to major concerns of the organism.”
The evidence for discrete emotions is controversial. Auto-
nomic responses, electroencephalographic features, and facial
expressions do not permit simple categorization and show little
evidence of the predicted correlations (10,24,25), though newer
machine learning approaches have shown that categorical in-
formation can be extracted from physiological (26) and neural
(27,28) data. The latter analyses have, however, clariﬁed that
there is no single underlying substrate for particular emotions.
Rather, each emotional category depends on a distributed
network of limbic but also cortical components that reﬂect the
particular neurocognitive processes involved (29).
An alternative view is that the discreteness of emotions
arises from the categorical labeling of internal events for the
purpose of intra- or intersubject communication. Neuro-
imaging has provided some support for such a model, arguing
that the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in categorical
labeling of emotional states (30–32) evolving along the two
major axes of valence (from good to bad) and arousal (from
high to low). Indeed, factor analyses of a variety of measures of
emotions including similarity ratings among words, facial
expression, and autonomic measures reliably identify these
two separate dimensions (33). Neuroimaging has also been
used to argue that while the amygdala tracks arousal, the
orbitofrontal cortex tracks valence across emotions (34).
VALUATION AND EMOTION
Basic and animal emotion research, with its grounding in
evolutionarily shaped responses, emphasizes the importance
of emotions in guiding behavior adaptively. A focus on adaptive
responding is also present in appraisal theories, which suggest
that emotions arise when events are judged to be relevant to
the individual’s “needs, attachments, values, current goals and
beliefs” (35). Computationally, inferring adaptive choices in-
volves integrating not only immediate rewards, but also longer-
term rewards, and for that reason requires consideration of the
future course of events. This evaluation of the future is where
the problem lies, as the further into the future one looks, the
broader the range of potential events. Speciﬁcally, valuation
involves summing over an exponentially expanding decision
tree of future possibilities. Optimal valuation would search the
entire tree, which is rarely feasible. Reinforcement learning is a
thriving subﬁeld of machine learning concerned with algo-
rithmic solutions to this problem.
Model-Free Accounts of Emotional Expression
A substantial body of work has related one such algorithmic
solution to how emotional expressions change over time (36).
In so-called model-free reinforcement learning, the stability of
the world is exploited to replace integration over the future with
actual past experiences. Clever bookkeeping allows the use of
prediction errors to update values that, in the limit of extensive
experience, are guaranteed to yield the true long-term values
of states and behaviors (37). Here, emotional responses are
viewed as a type of high-level action, involving multiple bio-
logical and neural subsystems. One example of such an
“action” is a freezing response, which has behavioral, atten-
tional, and physiological components. These high-level actions
are thought to be emitted either in an innate fashion (38) in
response to the appropriate species-speciﬁc unconditional
stimulus (39–41), or after learning in response to a conditioned
stimulus. In the latter case, the expression of the action is
proportional to the value attached to the conditioned stimulus,
which in turn is a scalar measure of the average expected
unconditional stimulus strength (42–44). This has been applied
to a wide variety of affective responses, including heart rate
changes (45), approach (46), avoidance (47,48), extinction (49),
vigor (50,51), and others. Perhaps the most striking success of
these models is their ability to capture how pavlovian affective
responses can lead to maladaptive choices (43,52).
Model-free approaches are very valuable to understand
how the expression of affect transfers between situations with
experience. Although mostly restricted to individual laboratory
sessions, the underlying model likely plays an important role in
explaining how individual differences in the expression of (af-
fective) behaviors emerge over (life)time, and potentially in
response to behavioral psychotherapeutic interventions.
Furthermore, a hierarchical version of model-free reinforce-
ment learning has the capacity to explain how complex high-
level actions consisting of multiple correlated processes
might emerge (53–55), though this awaits application to the
correlations among physiological, psychological, and behav-
ioral aspects of emotions.
Appraisals Require Model-Based Inference
Pure model-free accounts, however, fail to explain context
effects on conditioning. For instance, the physiological
response to a threat differs depending on whether the animal is
restrained or freely moving (56) as well as whether a refuge or
obstacle is present and at what distance (57–59). In humans,
framing the same movement as approach or withdrawal alters
whether a pavlovian conditioned stimulus promotes or inhibits
Valuation Framework for Emotions
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it (42). Even startle reﬂexes are potentiated by fear induction
(60), enhanced by upregulating negative emotions (61), and
reduced by positive emotions (62). More fundamentally,
context determines what affective behavior is emitted (21,63):
the same emotion of anger may motivate harm not only
through physical means in a boxing ring, but also through
ﬁnancial transactions in a boardroom setting.
Similarly, scalar summaries of past experience cannot ac-
count for the impact of appraisals on human emotions. The
appraisal of an event involves an assessment of what the event
“means” (35). This interpretative process determines whether
and which emotion results by inference of latent causes: a
smile is pleasant if interpreted as emanating from kindness, but
aversive if viewed as an expression of condescension. The fact
that an event is meaningful can be inferred from changes in
model-free values because these capture the expectation of
future well-being in a relatively stable environment, and sudden
changes in model-free expected values therefore indicate a
meaningful event. This is reminiscent of the argument that
changes in core affect invoke appraisals (10,33). Certain as-
pects of meaning may also be precomputed and result in
automatic appraisals (64,65), but what an event means for well-
being cannot be derived from model-free values. This
assessment involves a series of variables such as goal
congruence, controllability, and agency (35,66,67) that capture
how the changed contingencies induced by the event and the
behavior inﬂuence the controllable achievability of the goal
(68). Goal congruence, for instance, measures how events in-
ﬂuence the ability and cost of achieving current goals and as
such involves replanning a new path toward the goal and
comparing the cost of this path to that of the previous plan.
The computation of the meaning part of the appraisal
requires the integration of a model capturing an individual’s
beliefs about the consequences of choices, what re-
inforcements will be obtained in which states, how obser-
vations relate to hidden states, and how different states
relate to each other (37,65,69). Inferring such values requires
a model to be inverted or simulated. Mirroring the notion
that some appraisals rely on rule-based processes, it sug-
gests a role for nonautomatic components; it captures that
appraisals generalize and change over time as new infor-
mation is progressively integrated; it suggests how mal-
adaptive beliefs inﬂuence emotions; and it suggests how a
new understanding can alter emotions in explicit reappraisal
(35,63,66,70,71).
However, a measured and “rational” consideration of all
possible outcomes is hardly a sufﬁcient model of emotions
(72). In fact, reasoning itself is profoundly affected by emotions
(70), as are perception, learning, and memory.
METAREASONING
One factor that may be useful to consider is that model-
based inference is mostly impossible due to the sheer
size of most relevant model-based valuation problems.
Figure 1A shows a simple planning task in a maze the so-
lution of which corresponds to a binary decision tree
(Figure 1B). The best action at the root of the tree is the one
that leads to the path with the best total outcome, and this
may not be the action with the best immediate reward. As in
reality, there is usually more than one way to the goal, but
the different paths have different intermediate outcomes
rendering some better than others. Despite its simplicity,
humans have difﬁculty solving the task fully, and employ
strategies to avoid evaluating the entire tree even when
there are only three or four choices to go (Figure 1C). Un-
less they are highly constrained, such as in feedforward
motor control (73), optimal decisions in realistic situations
are computationally extremely demanding.
The limited resources lead to the metareasoning problem,
which concerns the optimal deployment of the available
computational power (7,8,74,75). It is a decision problem
about which of the various options to evaluate internally
(Figure 2). Formally, the estimated value of performing a
computation is the difference in expected utility between
taking a choice without the additional computation, and
taking a new alternative choice after having invested in the
computation (8,76). Although this decision problem is
mathematically similar to the original problem, it is different
from the original problem because simulations do not
actually incur the costs of the real problem, and while taking
real poor actions should be avoided to avoid incurring their
loss, internally simulating poor actions can be useful (77,78).
Thus, the states in this metareasoning problem are all
possible partial trees of the original tree, which is a far larger
state space than in the original problem.
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Figure 1. Model-based inference problems rapidly become too hard to fully solve. Consider a task (A)where subjects see six rectangles arranged hexagonally
and are taught to navigate according to the underlying transitionmatrix indicated by the arrows, so that they can transition fromeach state to two successor states
depending onwhich of two buttons they press. Every transition yields a reward or loss. Finding a path of a given length that maximizes total earnings corresponds
to a tree-shaped decision problem, for instance the one in panel (B) for three transitions starting from state 3. Participants typically choose not to expend cognitive
effort evaluating subtrees below a salient loss (here below transitions with –70 points), resulting in a cutting of or “pruning” of decision trees (B). (C) This in
turn results in worse performance when the optimal path requires transitioning through a salient loss (red) than when it does not (orange). Black dots and gray
lines show the effect in individual participants. (A) and (B) are modiﬁed with permission from Huys et al. (44). (C) shows data replotted from Huys et al. (55).
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Emotions Implement Approximate Metareasoning
Strategies
Model-based reasoning is hence faced with two profound
challenges: the size of the problem and the even harder task of
apportioning limited resources in an adaptive manner. These
are fundamental problems and a strategy to deal with them is
mandatory. The proposal here is that emotions can implement
approximate solutions to these challenges. In particular,
emotional states 1) come with a strong focus on particular
behaviors and 2) induce a strong perceptual and processing
focus such that evaluation is concentrated on a narrow set of
states. Emotions thereby effectively function as approximate
metareasoning strategies that prescribe how computational
resources are allocated. To what extent these approximations
are adaptive depends on how they are invoked. We ﬁrst
provide an outline for the implementation in terms of action
tendencies and state observations, and then turn to the
control issues.
Action Tendencies. One of the features of emotions about
which there is more agreement is that they prioritize certain
actions (13,35,79–81). Constraining the action space can
substantially simplify the valuation problem because the
computational cost is exponential in the size of the action
space.
At an abstract level, emotional states are accompanied by
distinct and richly experienced urges toward particular classes
of actions. Frijda et al. (20) asked people to remember events
of particular emotions and then to rate a list or 26 items about
the kinds of behaviors they wanted to engage in, such as “I
gave up,” “I wanted to protect myself from someone or
something,” or “I wanted to help someone, to take care of
someone.” From the ratings of these statements, the emotion
characterizing the episode could be reliably recovered. Though
very abstract, such rich descriptions are also important in
psychotherapeutic settings. In dialectic behavior therapy,
individuals are initially taught to recognize emotions by the
action tendencies they feel (71).
Emotions also induce physiological and vegetative
changes. However, physiological signatures of emotions do
not appear to readily differentiate between categorically
deﬁned emotions, but rather provide a few classes of general
action preparations [(79,82–84), though see (26)]. A preparatory
increase in heart rate to compensate for the anticipated drop in
peripheral resistance upon supplying blood to large muscle
groups is required when running, be it for escape or fun. As
such, these can be seen as a preparation toward a class of
behaviors that share physiological requirements.
State Observation. The complexity of model-based
evaluation is also exponential in the range of states
considered. There is ample evidence for emotion- or mood-
congruent processing biases (85,86). For instance, Bradley
et al. (87) showed that exposure to sad music and recol-
lection of sad memories produces an attentional bias to-
ward sad words, and such biases arise from the emotional
state rather than purely from the exposure to the emotional
word (88). By restricting attention to particular states and
disregarding others, the problem could again be reduced in
size (89), for instance by pruning (44) searches along
branches of the decision tree that result in states outside
the attentional focus.
A further aspect is that there is usually uncertainty about the
state. This profoundly complicates the computational task of
valuation because policies for the various possible states have
to be computed (90). By ascertaining the state, this complexity
can be reduced. Introspection about the state of the body likely
plays a particularly important role: the impact of a muscle’s
Figure 2. Metareasoning. Given a state and a
sequence of possible decisions, optimal action
choice involves evaluating a decision tree (top left).
An agent with constrained resources faces the
challenge of deciding what to simulate, i.e., what to
“think about.” For instance, it could choose to ﬁrst
simulate the action going left, and then continue
down this branch (leftmost set of trees). Alternatively,
it could superﬁcially consider the right action, and
then start examining the left action. The meta-
reasoning problem hence is a decision problem
where the states are knowledge states about the
decision tree, and the task is to choose to think
about the components of the problem at hand in the
way that is most likely to yield a good ﬁnal choice.
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activation depends on the joint position and the chances of
success in a ﬁght are reduced when already wounded.
Controlling Metareasoning Strategies
If there are multiple approximate metareasoning strategies,
then there must be some control over which is deployed when.
The ﬁrst source of control is likely evolutionary, where species-
speciﬁc responses provide a (potentially very strong) bias
toward evaluating particular actions, rather than toward emit-
ting the action entirely inﬂexibly. This allows for the kinds of
context effects on even innate responses mentioned above.
The second source of control could be, confusingly, model-
free. Performers may learn from experience that a certain
amount of catastrophizing improves their performance (91),
without an understanding of why that is. Etkin et al. (92) have
recently argued for a model-free component in serial adapta-
tions in the emotional conﬂict task, where individuals have to
indicate the facial expression (fear or happy) of a face with
either the matching or conﬂicting word superimposed over it
(93). Model-free learning has been argued to account for
learning in strategy selection (94): with repeated experience,
individuals can slowly increase their frequency of using
adaptive strategies for solving problems (95). We have recently
shown how the results of costly model-based evaluations are
memorized and simply replayed upon repeated encounter of
the same problem in a process called memoization (55) that
gives rise to decision-making biases that are characteristic of
the individual but highly variable across the population.
The third evaluative process for emotions allows for
knowledge to be incorporated in the form of heuristics.
Research on decisions about options with many attributes [for
instance cars, with price, speed, size, brand, etc. (96)] have
identiﬁed a host of different strategies. “Take the best” is
appropriate in noncompensatory environments where one
feature is most informative and can be used alone to rank
options. In compensatory environments, humans spend more
time and cognitive effort on examining multiple features and
integrating the information, but only if they are not under time
pressure (97). This suggests that individuals can access
approximate measures of how adaptive a particular cognitive
strategy is, and use this to guide their choice (98). In the
affective domain, misguided beliefs or schemas (99) about the
adaptiveness of strategies relate to a number of pathological
emotion regulation phenomena. Pathological worry in gener-
alized anxiety disorders (100,101) and rumination in depressive
disorders (102) are maintained by explicit beliefs about the
usefulness of worry and rumination, respectively. People who
dislike emotion regulation are more likely to respond with anger
to provocation (103). Depressed persons are not impaired at
emotion regulation strategies such as positive imagery to
improve their mood, but they have a reduced tendency to
employ them (104).
The fourth evaluative process, again confusingly, could be
model-based, where the precise consequences of particular
emotions are examined and evaluated. This is rarely feasible
and probably only commonly done in situational analyses in
psychotherapy, where emotions, thoughts, behavior, and
consequences are explicitly discussed (71,99,105). This allows
patients to learn to consciously and explicitly assess whether a
particular emotion is appropriate and helpful in a given situa-
tion, and to adapt it by using reappraisal and other emotion
regulation strategies if necessary.
DISCUSSION
We have attempted to sketch out a valuation framework for
emotions. We have argued why appraisals point toward a
model-based framework; how emotions may have a potentially
important role in facilitating model-based decisions by func-
tioning as internal strategies to allocate computational
resources; how emotions’ adaptive nature depends on their
deployment; and how a variety of different processes can lead
to adaptive or maladaptive deployment of emotion strategies.
Three desiderata for a computational framework of emotions
were put forth. The ﬁrst was the at best partially correlated
nature of physiological, psychological, and behavioral features.
The ﬂexibility the proposed framework allows for contrasts with
the view of basic emotions as relatively ﬁxed behavioral and
physiological action packages. As such, it reﬂects the lack of
identiﬁably discrete physiological or behavioral patterns or
single neurobiological cause (10,24,29). Similar to other
proposals, it emphasizes the importance of emotional
processes in more complex decision-making settings (106).
Space constraints have prevented us from exploring the
distinction between valence and arousal important to circum-
plex and core affect models, but this might naturally emerge
from valuation in continuous-time settings, where the rate at
which actions are emitted depends on the average reward rate
in the environment, albeit in sometimes complex ways
(36,50,51,107). Notably, the current proposal allows for mixed
emotions through a combination of metareasoning policies.
The second desideratum was the ability to account for
appraisal and contextual effects. The complexity of the
model-based valuation required for this led to the notion of
approximate metareasoning strategies. These approximate
strategies are necessarily often suboptimal and may capture
the prototypical adverse inﬂuences of emotion on cognition
(108). The focus on valuation is compatible with models
emphasizing prediction (109), but distinct in that it suggests
that the relevant predictions must be about long-term utility,
and that emotions play a key role in facilitating such pre-
dictions, albeit approximately.
The third desideratum concerned the nature of conscious
qualia of emotions. Doing so fully awaits a theory of con-
sciousness. However, two aspects are interesting to consider.
First, Dehaene and Naccache’s (110) notion of a global work-
space sits naturally with the notion of metareasoning. Situa-
tions with a high estimated value of computation should recruit
neural resources more extensively, and hence be more likely to
involve the brain-wide states postulated as representing the
global workspace. Second, it has been suggested that the
component processes in verbal self-report involve an intero-
ceptive component followed by a classiﬁcation process (30). In
our proposal, the metareasoning strategies would profoundly
inﬂuence what information was processed, and as such may
strongly determine future classiﬁcation. Interestingly, the
classiﬁcation process has been suggested to involve the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (31,32), which is also known to
mediate arbitration between valuation strategies (111).
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The framework laid out here makes a number of testable
predictions. First, the argument that appraisal involves model-
based reasoning means that it should be inﬂuenced by
cognitive, endocrine, and neuromodulatory variables known to
inﬂuence model-based reasoning (112–115). Second, we
emphasized the importance of the control of metareasoning
strategies and suggested that it may be subject to substantial
malleability. This in turn predicts that by training particular
metareasoning strategies it should be possible to selectively
facilitate certain emotions over others. Third, it suggests that
emotions do not represent valuations themselves, but rather
that they determine the process by which valuation occurs.
This predicts an inﬂuence of emotion on search in a relevant
model-based task rather than on values directly. The main
challenge for the framework is that it points to the critical
importance of understanding both the internal models of in-
dividuals and their strategies in searching them. Measuring
these is a difﬁcult scientiﬁc problem. Though this is as yet not
feasible, recent advances including whole-brain mapping of
semantic representations (116,117) combined with active and
passive sensing using mobile devices (118,119) should open
promising avenues.
The emphasis on model-based processes was partially
motivated by the ﬁnding that model-free measures of reward
processing and learning are unimpaired in depression
(120,121), and as such this work is an effort to start integrating
cognitive phenomena of clinical importance like dysfunctional
attitudes (122), helplessness (68), attributional/cognitive styles
(123,124), and appraisals (35) into a valuation framework.
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